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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
operation of the statute of Missouri the account or certificate must be
made "in form" payable to either or survivor; if a case is within this
requirement the statute creates a presumption that the depositor intended
to create a joint interest. As to those cases not affected by the statute, the
Missouri Courts of Appeals have in the past wavered between the joint-
tenancy basis and the gift basis. See Craig v. Bradley (1910) 153 Mo.
App. 586, 134 S. W. 1081; Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Du Montimer, supra;
Martin v. First Nat. Bank (1921) 206 Mo. App. 629, 227 S. W. 656. The
Supreme Court of Missouri seems to have settled the matter by its state-
ment that the burden which the survivor must sustain at the trial to estab-
lish the gift of a joint interest in a deposit -Vith the resultant right of
survivorship is that of proving merely the depositor's "intention of cre-
ating a joint tenancy . . . with the right of survivorship." The fact
that the depositor's main purpose in changing the account to a joint one
was that the other party should receive it directly on her death without its
passing through administration will not prevent the survivor from receiv-
ing it on the death of the depositor. Murphy v. Wolfe, above.
J. D. F., '32.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-CONDITIONAL DELIVERY-PAROL EVIDENE-
"MERGENCE" CLAUSE.-In the case of J. B. Colt Co. v. Gregor (Mo. 1931)
44 S. W. (2d) 2 the defendant had purchased a carbide plant from the
plaintiff under a contract which declared expressly that the contract
covered all agreements. When the Company had accepted the contract,
the defendant executed a note for the purchase price, in accordance with
the terms of the contract, and delivered the note to the Company's agent
upon an oral understanding that the defendant was to keep the machine
a year and that, if it proved unsatisfactory, he could reject it and have
his note back. The machine proved entirely unsuitable. In this suit on
the note, the defendant sets up a three-fold defense based upon failure of
consideration, breach of warranty, and conditional delivery. The case
was actually litigated upon the third defense alone. The trial court ad-
mitted over plaintiff's objection parol evidence of the conditional delivery.
Held: Since the contract was complete on its face and provided that it
covered all agreements, it was error to admit parol evidence of the con-
dition.
As the Supreme Court of Missouri admits the proposition that as be-
tween the original parties parol evidence is admissible to show a condi-
tional delivery of the instrument and a failure of the condition is too well
established to be doubted. This has been codified by the Negotiable Instru-
ments Act, section 16. See R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 2645. The decision is
hardly more than an arbitrary determination that this principle is inap-
plicable where the negotiable instrument arises out of a contract which
has a so-called "mergence" clause.
It is doubtful whether the process of judicial legislation ought to be exer-
cised to attain such a result. It has been repeatedly said by the courts that,
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where a contract and a note are executed contemporaneously and relate
to the same subject-matter and transaction, they must be construed to-
gether. Spotton v. Dyer (1919) 42 Cal. App. 485, 184 Pac. 23; National
Bank of Watervliet v. Martin (1923) 203 App. Div. 390, 196 N. Y. S. 714,
af'd (1923) 235 N. Y. 611, 139 N. E. 755; Collins v. Schaffer (1916) 66
Colo. 84, 179 Pac. 154; Jennings v. Todd (1893) 118 Mo. 296, 24 S. W. 148;
Williams v. Kessler (Mo. App. 1927) 298 S. W. 242. In applying this rule
of construction, the Missouri Supreme Court has imported into the note
the stipulation that the written documents "cover all agreements" and
therefore prevent the defendant from proving the conditional nature of
the delivery by evidence of a separate parol agreement.
Many cases reiterate the well-known formula that "all prior and con-
temporaneous agreements are merged into the written contract." Brown
v. Johanson (1921) 69 Colo. 400, 194 Pac. 943; Barbaret v. Meyers (1912)
248 Mo. 58, 144 S. W. 824. The doctrine of "mergence" and the "mergence"
clauses merely restate the parol evidence rule in a different form. 13 C. J.
598. If the contract is silent on some term or in some way does not pur-
port to express the full agreement of the parties, the courts will admit
parol evidence to explain or complete it. Phoenix Publishing Co. v. River-
side Clothing Co. (1893) 54 Minn. 205, 55 N. W. 912; Peabody v. Bement
(1890) 79 Mich. 47, 44 N. W. 416. However, the opposite is true if the
contract purports on its face to be complete. Samuel Chute Co. V. Latta
(1913) 123 Minn. 69, 142 N. W. 1048; Wheaton Roller Mill Co. V. Noye
Manufacturing Co. (1896) 66 Minn. 156, 68 N. W. 854. This is the only
effect of the mergence clause and it in reality adds nothing to the parol
evidence rule. Therefore, the question in the principal case turns upon a
consideration of what type of contemporaneous oral agreements come with-
in the prohibition of the parol evidence rule. This principle excludes state-
ments which contradict, vary, or modify the terms of a written agreement.
Spelman v. Delano (1915) 187 Mo. App. 119, 172 S. W. 1163; Coloin V.
Post Mortgage Co. (1916) 173 App. Div. 85, 159 N. Y. S. 361. But a writ-
ten instrument, though purporting to be a definite simple contract, may be
shown by parol evidence to have been delivered conditionally. Bowser &
Co. v. Tarry (1911) 156 N. C. 35, 72 S. E. 74; Bartlolomew v. Fell (1914)
92 Kan. 64, 139 Pac. 1016; Gamble v. Riley (1913) 39 Okla. 363, 135 Pac.
390. This is particularly true in the case of bills and notes. Smith v.
Dottering (1911) 200 N. Y. 299, 93 N. E. 985; Adams v. Thurmond (1915)
48 Okla. 189, 149 Pac. 1141. Furthermore by codifying this principle into
section 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Act a profound policy has been
indicated to permit proof of conditional delivery by parol. Thus it would
seem that if the Missouri Supreme Court disagreed with the above au-
thorities and felt that the "mergence" clause coupled with the parol evi-
dence rule should operate to exclude parol evidence of conditional delivery,
the Court should have recognized the specific applicability of section 16 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act to the doubtful general application of the
parol evidence rule and a "mergence" clause which really adds nothing to
the rule. A. W. P., '33.
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